O presente ensaio analisará três obras de Sartre, La Transcendance de l’ego (1936), L’Être et lenéant (1943) e Cahiers pour une morale (1983). Tentaremos demonstrar que esse percurso é,ao mesmo tempo, a evolução e a manutenção de algumas teses enunciadas na primeira obra.Identificaremos alguns dos objetivos da filosofia sartriana, tanto na moral quanto na política,revelando o papel central do Ego nessa discussão, e, por fim, identificaremos as consequênciasmorais de uma nova concepção da consciência, do ego e da reflexão edificadas por (...) Sartre aolongo de sua trajetória. (shrink)

The present study analyzes the relations between Mauss and Sartre. It investigates, primarily, the connections between the obligation of reciprocating a gift and the consequences of this symbolic act, to elaborate a morality deemed as a total fact. Freedom stands out, in this context, as a fundamental value.

O artigo pretende distinguir os conceitos de fabricação e criação em Bergson. Tal distinção permitirá compreender duas faces de produção dos objetos no mundo: a arte e técnica.: The article aims to distinguish the concepts of production and creation in the philosophy of Bergson. Such a distinction would understand both sides of the production of objects in the world: the art and technique. Keywords: production of technical objects; creation of artistic objects; Bergson.

A hipótese do presente estudo é a seguinte: a obra de Dilthey representa a verdadeira fundamenta-ção da metodologia própria ao estudo das ciências humanas. Em particular, a constituição de uma antropologia radicada no método compreensivo. Esse método é a principal estrutura sobre a qual podem ser erigidas as ciências humanas. Não se pretende vincular estreitamente toda a história do pensamento contemporâneo aos pressupostos da filosofia de Dilthey. A intenção é tecer um fio condutor suficientemente resistente a ponto de tornar-se a (...) fundamentação da filosofia que se quer metodologicamente independente das ciências naturais. (shrink)

mit Beitr. v. Günter C. Behrmann. hrsg. v. Günter Saße. ; Volltext // Exemplar mit der Signatur: München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek -- Z 65.262-1447.

This article presents an introductory overview of the interpretations of schizophrenia offered by three phenomenological psychiatrists: Eugene Minkowski (1885-1972), Wolfgang Blankenburg (b. 1928), and Kimura Bin (b. 1931). Minkowski views schizophrenia as characterized by a diminished sense of dynamic and vital connection to the world ("loss of vital contact"), often accompanied by a hypertrophy of intellectual and static tendencies ("morbid rationalism," "morbid geometrism"). Blankenburg emphasizes the patient's loss of the normal sense of obviousness or "natural self-evidence"—a loss of the usual (...) common-sense background that enables normal persons to cope easily with the social and practical world. Kimura focuses on certain distortions of self-experience: a distinctive splitting of the subjective self, alienated awareness of one's own ongoing consciousness, and profound uncertainty about the "I-ness" of the self. In addition to a summary, this article offers a comparison and critique of these three approaches. The three approaches are also considered in light of a more recent, phenomenological formulation of schizophrenia as a disorder of self-experience (an ipseity disturbance) involving hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection (i.e., heightened awareness of aspects of experience that would normally remain tacit or presupposed and decline in the feeling of existing as a subject of awareness). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 71-80 [Access article in PDF] Some Reflections on the (Analytic) Philosophical Approach to Delusion Louis A. Sass There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." —Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5 The peculiar, often problematic phenome na of psychopathology have been attract ing the attention of analytic philosophers in recent years. The topic of delusion (...) has been a particular draw, with a number of analytic philosophers attempting to use their conceptual tools, usually combined with ideas from cognitive neuroscience, to criticize the traditional understanding and to clarify the nature of this central psychiatric topic. It is useful to have this kind of interdisciplinary dialogue. Indeed, there is good reason to hope that concepts honed in the philosophy of mind and other philosophical subfields will help to sort out our understanding of a phenomenon (or set of phenomena) for which contemporary psychiatric definitions and conceptualizations are clearly inadequate and, in some respects, downright misleading (see Parnas and Sass 2001; Spitzer 1990).1Here, however, I would like to call attention to some weaknesses that, it seems to me, are rather common (I do not say universal) in many analytic philosophical approaches to psychopathology. In my opinion, there is a tendency to formulate issues and arguments in overly polarized, even dichotomous terms, and then to rely too uncritically on these essentialistic formulations in exploring the domain of inquiry. Although this polarizing tendency sometimes has the salutary effect of clarifying conceptual domains, it can, when taken too far, actually hamper our understanding of phenomena that are often fraught with ambiguities and complexities that defy many standard conceptualizations.The relationship between philosophy and psychopathology is obviously a two-way street—we are familiar, for example, with disorders that challenge deep philosophical assumptions about self and mind (e.g., blindsight, split-brain phenomena, perhaps also Dissociative Identity Disorder, and the first rank symptoms of schizophrenia). I am suggesting that, in their work on delusions, philosophers may need to put more emphasis on moving from the natural phenomena [End Page 71] of psychopathology and to the domain of philosophical analysis.I believe that a greater sensitivity to the modes of knowing associated with the phenomenological tradition, and to the forms of conceptual self-critique fostered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, are crucial ingredients for any adequate approach to delusion as well as many other topics in psychopathology. In my opinion, the work of many analytic philosophers interested in psychopathology would be enriched if they spent more time trying to discover and imagine what it might be like to experience certain kinds of abnormal psychiatric conditions, and also speculating about what implications such experiential modalities might have for action and verbal expression. I believe they would also be wise to spend more time questioning, and attempting to transcend, the philosophically derived conceptual distinctions and dichotomies that appear to organize their conceptual universes. Phenomenological imagination and Wittgensteinian critique can show how to move outside the conceptual capsule and into the rich and strange realms of actual experience, both normal and abnormal.So far I have offered only slogans. Let me use the articles by Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie (2004) and Robert Klee (2004) to flesh out the criticisms I have offered. There is much that is intelligent and much that is worthwhile in both their articles. (For example, I was largely convinced by the criticisms of John Campbell and of Donald Davidson that are central to the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee, respectively.) Here, however, I will focus only on issues that illustrate the above-mentioned tendencies—tendencies that, in my view, tend to infect even the best writings on the (analytic) philosophy of psychiatry. I will also make some remarks about the works of Campbell and Davidson, the two philosophers criticized in the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee. Because the article by Eugenie Georgaca (2004) is in a different tradition, I will say only a few words about it at the end. Bayne and Pacherie on the Preservation-Of-meaning... (shrink)

In the United States, at least 6% of all hospital beds are in the intensive care unit or coronary care unit. The cost of treating a patient in an intensive care unit averages from $2,000 to $3,500 per day. At least 10–40% of intensive care patients will not survive to hospital discharge. Today, every major category of disease may be found in the modern ICU; common diagnoses are septicemia, postsurgical complications, cerebrovascular accidents, gastrointestinal bleeding, neoplasia, and respiratory failure. ICUs employ (...) some of the most sophisticated medical technology, routinely monitoring the cardiopulmonary performance of patients and often providing assisted ventilation. ICUs are high intensity in terms of their staffing, involving 24-hour physician supervision and nurse:patient ratios from 1:3 to 1:1. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 125-132 [Access article in PDF] Incomprehensibility and Understanding:On the Interpretation of Severe Mental Illness Louis A. Sass Keywords hermeneutics, psychopathology, paradox, Wittgenstein, solipsism, delusion, principle of charity, phenomenological psychopathology. I would like to begin by thanking Rupert Read for the care he has put into reading my work, and into thinking through its implications in the context of the "new-Wittgensteinian" interpretation of (...) the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This interpretation derives from an influential reading of this philosopher's early book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), that is not explicitly discussed in Read's article, yet that lies behind much of his argument. Read does allude to this reading of the Tractatus when he refers to the concept of "logically alien thought" (see Conant [1992]), and by citing, in his endnotes, the Diamond, Conant, and Cerbone articles that appear in Crary and Read's edited collection, The New Wittgenstein (2000). In an earlier paper that also addresses my work, "On approaching schizophrenia through Wittgenstein," Read (2001) explicitly discusses the relevance of the new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus.According to this new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein took absolutely seriously his own realization (explicitly stated at the end of the Tractatus) that his book was internally self-contradictory, and he therefore realized that all or nearly all the sentences of the Tractatus must be totally devoid of any meaning or semantic reference. According to this austere view, the vast bulk of the Tractatus only pretends to be making meaningful statements about the nature of logic and semantics; its real purpose is to give the reader the illusion of meaning, and this it does in order to lead the reader to the eventual realization that there can in fact be no meaningful statements or thoughts at the level of self-referential abstraction at which the Tractatus pretends to be operating. Further, when Wittgenstein (1961) writes (in the famous last line of the book), "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (p. 189), this statement should, supposedly, not be taken as any kind of mystical pointing toward some ineffable realm or truth, but, rather, as an austere recognition that there just are no ineffable truths—that, so to speak, there just is no mystical there there. [End Page 125]Rupert Read sees an analogy between, on the one hand, the (supposedly mistaken) readers of Wittgenstein's Tractatus who think that Wittgenstein is exploiting self-contradiction to allude to some higher, ineffable truth (i.e., something that can be pointed at even if it cannot be said), and, on the other hand, my own elucidation of Schreber's contradictions (see especially Chapter 2 of Paradoxes of Delusion [1994]) to argue that Schreber can be said to be having particular kinds of experiences, which I refer to as solipsistic or quasi-solipsistic in nature. Just as Wittgenstein's self-contradictions can (supposedly) point nowhere other than to their own failure to mean, so Schreber's self-contradictory and other nonstandard statements cannot (according to Read) be used to illuminate in any meaningful way the form of experience that supposedly lies behind them—as I, for example, have tried to do by offering a phenomenological account of Schreber and schizophrenia. Patients like Schreber and Renée cannot really be understood, just as we cannot really understand logically alien thought—which, in fact, is not really thought at all; in both cases, there is only the illusion of meaning, only the mirage of an alternative mode of thinking or of living. This, at least, is Read's new-Wittgensteinian claim.Few readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will, I suspect, be familiar with these discussions centering on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which were introduced largely by the philosophers Cora Diamond and James Conant (see Crary and Read [2000]). (I myself have found their writings fascinating and inspiring in many ways, despite my ultimate disagreement on fundamental issues.) 1 Most readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will have no way of assessing the validity of this austere reading of the Tractatus... (shrink)

We propose that typical schizophrenic delusions develop on the background of preexisting anomalies of self-experience. We argue that disorders of the Self represent the experiential core clinical phenomena of schizophrenia, as was already suggested by the founders of the concept of schizophrenia and elaborated in the phenomenological psychiatric tradition. The article provides detailed descriptions of the pre-psychotic or schizotypal anomalies of self-experience, often illustrated through clinical vignettes. We argue that delusional transformation in the evolution of schizophrenic psychosis reflects a global (...) reorganization of consciousness and existential reorientation, both of which radiate from a fundamental alteration of the Self. We critically address the contemporary cognitive approaches to delusion formation, often finding them inconsistent with the clinical features of schizophrenia or implausible from a phenomenological point of view. (shrink)

What does it mean for ethics to say, as Wittgenstein did, that philosophy “leaves everything as it is”? -/- Though clearly absorbed with ethical questions throughout his life and work, Wittgenstein's remarks about the subject do not easily lend themselves to summation or theorizing. Although many moral philosophers cite the influence or inspiration of Wittgenstein, there is little agreement about precisely what it means to do ethics in the light of Wittgenstein. -/- Ethics after Wittgenstein brings together an international cohort (...) of leading scholars in the field to address this problem. The chapters advance a conception of philosophical ethics characterized by an attention to detail, meaning and importance which itself makes ethical demands on its practitioners. Working in conversation with literature and film, engaging deeply with anthropology and critical theory, and addressing contemporary problems from racialized sexual violence against women to the Islamic State, these contributors reclaim Wittgenstein's legacy as an indispensable resource for contemporary ethics. (shrink)

This paper outlines several of the challenges that are inherent in any attempt to communicate subjective experience to others, particularly in the context of a clinical interview. It presents the phenomenological interview as a way of effectively responding to these challenges, which may be especially important when attempting to understand the profound experiential transformations that take place in schizophrenia. Features of language experience in schizophrenia—including changes in interpersonal orientation, a sense of the arbitrariness of language, and a desire for faithful (...) communication of experience —are described, together with discussion of their relevance for the interview context. Furthermore, the interview presents a unique context in which both intersubjective and interpersonal aspects of experience will be described as well as evoked. It is proposed that phenomenological interviewers should not only be familiar with these and other experiences that can occur in schizophrenia, but also capable of applying the techniques of phenomenological and hermeneutic methods in order to understand the descriptions of interviewees with sensitivity and accuracy. (shrink)

Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer was born in Marburg Germany on October 14, 1812. Bayrhoffer first taught philosophy at Marburg University, there becoming a Full Professor in 1845. But in 1846, having been suspended from his teaching by reason of his politically free-thinking activities on behalf of the atheistic Lichtfreunde movement, he entered into Hessian politics, becoming - during its last week - the President of the Hesse Electorial Council. To escape political persecution in the period of the 1848 revolution, he, his (...) wife, and their six children emigrated to the United States in 1852. He purchased a farm of 140 acres in Jordan, Green Country, Wisconsin. The following year, his wife died. He soon remarried to a Charlotte Draz, who lived until 1864, being survived not only by her husband but by their two children. (shrink)

: 5–7, and on Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer, “A Hegelian in South Wisconsin,” The Owl of Minerva, 12, 4, : 1–3.).

É possível afirmar que a filosofia da liberdade de Sartre contenha as bases de uma Ética? Algo corrente de sua biografia é que ele, como sequência de sua obra magna pretendia escrever uma Moral; mas essa pretensão acabou se resumindo a simples anotações de trabalho publicadas postumamente. Algo similar ocorre quando ele publica sua segunda grande obra, que também teria seu volume prático, jamais levado a termo. Considerando que toda a filosofia de Sartre está pautada no princípio da liberdade humana (...) absoluta e irrestrita, essa não seria a razão de tal malogro? No intuito de introduzir essa questão escrevemos esse artigo. (shrink)

The philosophy developed by Sartre is the philosophy of freedom. This is confirmed by his work, whether in literary or theatrical texts, in political interventions and even in travel reports; but it is in technical works that this concern is even more evident: Sartre sustains that his philosophy must fulfill three tasks, of which the first – and most important – is the metaphysical liberation of men and women. Being and Nothingness fulfills precisely this task; it is against Kant and (...) distancing itself from Husserl and Heidegger that, first, freedom reveals itself as phenomenological truth: I am freedom; second, against all determinism, whether of externality, such as History (situation, class, etc.), or of interiority, such as Ego (transcendental Self, character, etc.), Sartre shows that freedom is also the foundation of History and the beginning of every individual adventure (life story, Psyche), both expressions of the same genesis: the singularity of freedom, self-sustaining process of being-in-the-world, is the only source of what man is and, consequently, of everything that can come to Being. Phenomenological ontology is the foundational work of the philosophy of freedom. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Dies ist eine Antwort auf George Pattisons magistrale Triologie über eine „Philosophy of Christian Life“ – mit Schwerpunkt auf dem zweiten Teil: „A Rhetorics of the Words“. Der Beitrag bietet eine Analyse des zentralen Begriffes, nämlich des „Rufs“ oder der „Berufung“. Dies führt zu drei grundlegenden Fragen nach dem fehlenden Gemeinschaftscharakter der Berufung in Pattisons Darstellung; seiner einseitigen Neigung zum Pessimismus in seiner Kulturkritik; und, der nur marginalen Rolle, die andere Artikulationen als der Ruf innerhalb eines „frommen Lebens“ und (...) seiner ambivalenten Autorität spielen. (shrink)

This article examines the structure of self-consciousness in people with schizophrenia. The findings indicate that our self-experience is not neutral with respect to the metaphysical status of the self and that it is important to attend carefully to the experience of the subject in order to understand schizophrenia. The results also suggest that the variable disruptions in the sense of self-presence, first-person perspective, and the phenomenality of experience in schizophrenics directly affect the minimal self and it may also have implications (...) for the narrative self. (shrink)

New dimensions in different ethical scenarios following genetic information require new medical-ethical Action Guides for physician-patient interaction. This paper discusses the ambiguity in moral choice between a “right not to know” and “a duty to know”, regarding parental decisionmaking pro or contra selective abortion following prenatal screening for autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (Potter III) and related public policy issues.

Wenn Gott keine metaphysische Ergänzung der Welt ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie Gott dann gedacht werden muss, damit wahrhaft von Gott die Rede ist? Hartmut von Sass beantwortet diese Frage, indem er drei Thesen ausarbeitet: dass Gottes Wesen identisch ist mit seinem Handeln; dass dieses Handeln an uns in seiner Offenbarung für uns besteht; und dass dieses offenbarende Handeln in ein neues Selbst- und Weltverständnis des Menschen mündet. Kombiniert man diese drei Thesen, ist Gottes Wirken und damit Gott (...) selbst neu zu verorten: Nicht um einen zur Welt addierten Referenten geht es, sondern um eine irreduzible Referenz auf die uns umgebende Welt. Diese Umstellung vom Denken in Substanzen zum Verstehen in Vollzügen wird als Modalisierung des Glaubens bezeichnet. Den entsprechenden Konsequenzen für einen postmetaphysischen Gottesbegriff geht der Autor im Gespräch mit der Hermeneutischen Theologie und ihren philosophischen Grundlagen nach. (shrink)

God’s being is becoming – the title is the thesis. The first section of this paper will be dedicated to the problem of radical historicity in sketching three dogmatic approaches dealing with the relation between God and history. After critically introducing the concept of relational – in contrast to intrinsic – properties in the second section I will apply a revised version of this concept theologically in integrating it into the architecture of Trinitarian thinking. Accordingly, and on that basis, the (...) last section can address the ambivalent as well as precarious question in which sense God’s ultimate being is in real coming. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie Jahrgang: 58 Heft: 4 Seiten: 489-504.

ZusammenfassungTraditionell wird angenommen, Eigenschaften müssten bestimmte Träger besitzen. Wenn es um Handlungen geht, müsste entsprechend ein Agent existieren, der diese Handlungen ausführt. Wendet man dieses naheliegende Bild ins Theologische, gerät man jedoch in all jene Probleme, die wir vom Theismus geerbt haben. Ein revisionärer Atheismus möchte hingegen das ursprüngliche Anliegen, das hinter jenem Bild steckt, bewahren, während das Verhältnis zwischen Gott und seinen Prädikaten und Eigenschaften neu bedacht wird. Dazu ist an Feuerbachs Identifizierung von ‚Gott‘ und ‚Liebe‘ zu erinnern, die (...) im Gespräch mit einigen Wittgensteinschen Stimmen präzisiert wird, um schließlich nach Gottes Wirklichkeit als Wirken an uns zu fragen. Einer Antwort nähern wir uns, indem Gottes Realität für uns mit der eines von uns zu rezipierenden Kunstwerkes analogisiert wird. Gegen die damit gewonnene differenzierte Gleichsetzung von Gott und seinen Eigenschaften stellen sich gewichtige Einwände; diese kommen gegen Ende zu Wort. (shrink)

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGTraditionell wird Demea als das schwächste Glied in Humes berühmten Dialogues concerning Natural Religion angesehen; die Bühne ist ganz dominiert vom optimistischen Theismus, der durch Cleanthes vertreten wird, und den dagegen gerichteten skeptischen Manövern vonseiten Philos. Entgegen diesem traditionellen Bild wird der ›orthodoxe‹ Demea nun verteidigt mit der These: Demea hat – von Hume selbst ungewollt und unbemerkt – das Interessanteste zum religiösen Glauben beizutragen; in ihm deutet sich eine Position jenseits der metaphysischen Phantasien des Theismus einerseits und Philos Destruktionen, (...) die in eine moralische Minimalversion des Glaubens zu münden scheinen, andererseits an. Es wird deutlich, dass diese Verteidigung keine primär exegetischen Ziele verfolgt, sondern auf eine in Humes Figurenkabinett nur treffend personifizierte Konstellation reagiert, die uns sehen lässt, an welchem Punkt theologisch und religionsphilosophisch auch heute zu arbeiten wäre. Dazu wird nach einer begrifflichen Kritik an Cleanthes und Philo anhand von drei konkreten Beispielen herausgearbeitet, wie ein Bild religiösen Glaubens aussehen könnte, das jenseits der metaphysischen Hoffnungen, die Gott zu einer Person erklären, und der reduktionistischen Zugeständnisse, die in ›Gott‹ lediglich den Ausdruck einer moralischen Einstellung zu erkennen meinen, liegt. Demea steht somit für ein postmetaphysisches Bild religiösen Glaubens – und wir sind eingeladen, zu den »friends of Demea« zu gehören.SUMMARYTraditionally, Demea is considered to be the weakest part in Hume's famous Dialogues concerning Natural Religion; the stage is completely dominated by Cleanthes' optimistic theism and by Philo's sceptical moves already critical of the former. Contrary to this traditional approach, however, the ›orthodox‹ Demea will be defended here in maintaining: Demea contributes – neither consciously intended nor recognized by Hume – the most interesting observations concerning religious belief; in him a position is at least alluded lying beyond the metaphysical fantasies of theism on the one hand and Philo's destructions which seem to amount to a moral minimal version on the other hand. It will be clear that this defense is not exegetically orientated; rather, it reacts to a constellation just personalized by Hume's ›casting‹ letting us see at which topics we shall continue to work theologically as well as philosophically today. Accordingly and following a conceptual critique of Cleanthes and Philo it will be elaborated by three concrete examples how a picture of religious belief could look like located beyond metaphysical hopes turning God to a person and reductivist concessions regarding ›God‹ as a mere expression of a moral attitude. Demea, however, represents a postmetaphysical picture of religious belief – and we are invited to belong to the »friends of Demea«. (shrink)